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travelers returning from Cuba with a rash, similarly to pa-
tients returning from other countries in which dengue fever, 
chikungunya fever, and Zika virus infection are endemic. 
Preventive measures, including advice to travelers on 
proper use of insect repellents, are critical for preventing 
CHIKV infection.
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To the Editor: Zika virus is an emerging virus that has 
spread to most countries in Latin America and the Caribbe-
an (1,2). It is transmitted by mosquitoes and through sexual 
intercourse (3). Most persons infected with Zika virus are 
asymptomatic or experience mild symptoms (4). However, 
in a pregnant woman, infection may cause severe pregnan-
cy and birth complications, most notably microcephaly in 
children infected in utero (5–7). Zika virus infection might 
also be associated with an increased incidence of Guillain-
Barré syndrome (8). Thus, the virus represents a threat to 
healthcare workers who manage infected patients or diag-
nostic samples and researchers who work with infectious 
virus in laboratories. 
Working with Zika virus, a Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-
2) pathogen in the European Union, except for the United 
Kingdom (where it is BSL-3), requires specific safety pre-
cautions (9). No inactivation data specific for Zika virus 
are available (9); consequently, disinfection guidelines are 
based on protocols to inactivate other flaviviruses. To gain 
experimental evidence regarding inactivation and disinfec-
tion for Zika virus, we determined its susceptibility to vari-
ous disinfectants and inactivation methods.
To test susceptibilities, we determined the 50% tissue 
cell infectious dose per milliliter (TCID50/mL) (10) of the 
Zika virus MR766 strain (1) before and after the virus was 
exposed to disinfectants or other inactivation procedures 
(online Technical Appendix,  http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/22/9/16-0664-Techapp1.pdf). We then determined 
the effect of alcohol-based disinfectants on viral infectiv-
ity. Using Zika virus stock containing 2.5% fetal calf serum 
(FCS) mixed 3:10 (vol/vol) with indicated alcohols, we 
incubated the mixture for 1 minute and then used it for in-
fection (Figure, panel A). All alcohols entirely inactivated 
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the virus. Complete loss of infectivity was also observed 
after virus exposure to 1% hypochlorite (often used to in-
activate virus in liquid wastes in BSL-2/3 laboratories), 2% 
paraformaldehyde (used to inactivate virus for subsequent 
flow cytometry), and 2% glutaraldehyde (often applied 
to fix virus for subsequent electron microscopy analysis) 
(Figure, panel A). Thus, routinely used disinfectants and 
inactivation procedures are sufficient to inactivate Zika 
virus in laboratory virus stocks. Next, we repeated these 
experiments in the presence of a high protein load using 
Zika virus preparations supplemented with FCS in increas-
ing concentrations (10%, 40%, 90%), to mimic virus found 
in clinically relevant material. Again, all treatments entirely 
disrupted Zika virus infectivity (Figure, panel A).
Ultraviolet (UV) radiation inactivates viruses by chem-
ically modifying the genome. We exposed 200 μL of Zika 
virus preparations containing increasing concentrations of 
serum to UV light of a laminar flow for up to 60 minutes. 
Exposure for 10 minutes entirely inactivated Zika virus in 
the presence of 2.5% FCS serum; increasing concentrations 
of serum reduced the antiviral effects of UV light (Figure, 
panel B). When Zika virus containing 90% serum was ex-
posed for 60 min to UV light, infectivity was reduced by 
99.95%; however, some residual infectivity was detected 
(Figure, panel B).
Next, we evaluated environmental stability by drying 
100 μL of Zika virus stock for 18 hours. Thereafter, dried 
virus was reconstituted in the same volume of medium or 
disinfectants. Endpoint titrations showed that the recon-
stituted virus remained infectious, although TCID50 was 
reduced by ≈3 orders of magnitude (Figure, panel C). All 
disinfectants and UV radiation entirely inactivated dried 
Zika virus (Figure, panel C). Additional experiments dem-
onstrated that dried Zika virus remained infectious for >3 
days (Figure, panel D) suggesting, for example, that dried 
droplets can be infectious, confirming that proper surface 
disinfection is essential.
We also assessed the environmental stability of Zika 
virus to heat and change in pH. The virus was stable at tem-
peratures up to 50°C but lost all infectivity at temperatures 
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Figure. Inactivation and environmental stability of Zika virus. Asterisks (*) indicate lack of infection. A) Virus stocks containing 2.5%, 10%, 
40%, or 90% fetal calf serum were incubated with alcohol-based disinfectants for 1 min. All disinfectants inactivated the virus. B) Virus 
stocks containing indicated concentrations of fetal calf serum were exposed to the ultraviolet (UV) light of a laminar flow hood. Higher 
concentrations of serum required more time to inactivate the virus. C) Virus stock was dried for 18 h and was then reconstituted in medium 
or the indicated disinfectants for 5 min or exposed to 10 min UV light before reconstitution. All disinfectants inactivated the virus. D) Virus 
was dried and incubated for indicated periods of time. Thereafter, dried virus was reconstituted in medium or 70% (vol/vol) isopropanol. 
Isopropanol inactivated the virus, but dried virus in medium remained infectious even after 84 h of incubation. E) Zika virus was incubated 
for 5 min at indicated temperatures. Temperatures >60°C inactivated the virus. F) Stocks were adjusted to indicated pH values and 
incubated for 10 min. pH levels <4 or >11 deactivated the virus. G) Finger tips of laboratory gloves were cut off, with or without introducing 
a hole by pinching with a needle, and put into medium. Glove tips were filled with virus stock and incubated for 90 min at room temperature. 
All gloves without needle holes were protective against transmission; 2 of 3 gloves with needle holes allowed virus transmission. For 
detailed experimental description, see online Technical Appendix (http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/article/22/9/16-0664-Techapp1.pdf). DMSO, 
dimethyl sulfoxide; E, ethanol; G, glutaraldehyde; H, hypochlorite; I, incidin, IP, isopropanol; M, medium, M+, medium plus 10 min UV; ND, 
not dried; PBS, phosphate-buffered saline; PF, paraformaldehyde; TCID50, 50% tissue culture infective dose; UV, ultraviolet. 
of >60°C (Figure, panel E). Thus, virus-contaminated ma-
terials such as surgical instruments can be decontaminated 
by heat. We also found that Zika virus infectivity was high-
est after adjusting the stock to a pH of ≈9 (Figure, panel 
F). In contrast, adjusting Zika virus to pH 12 or to <pH 4 
abrogated infectivity (Figure, panel F).
Finally, we analyzed whether gloves routinely used in 
BSL-2 laboratories protect against Zika virus. For this, we 
cut off fingertips of nitrile and latex gloves, filled tips with 
a Zika virus suspension, and placed them into cell culture 
plates containing medium. Virus-containing fingertips were 
inserted in such a way that diffusion would only occur if the 
virus passed through the nitrile/latex barrier. As a control, 
we made a hole of <1 mm in the fingertips. All 3 tested 
gloves prevented virus diffusion (Figure, panel G). How-
ever, if glove integrity was disrupted by a pin, the virus 
passed through in 2 of 3 cases (Figure, panel G).
We demonstrated that Zika virus is destroyed by clas-
sical disinfectants and inactivation methods and that nitrile 
and latex gloves are protective. We also showed that UV 
light of a laminar flow hood inactivates Zika virus, but 
particularly if the virus is in a protein-rich environment, 
the exposure time range should be in hours rather than in 
minutes. Although we expected that Zika virus would be 
inactivated by alcohol and disinfectants, we conducted a 
thorough experimental verification to exclude uncertainties 
surrounding work with this emerging pathogen.
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To the Editor: Klebsiella pneumoniae is mainly re-
sponsible for hospital-acquired urinary tract infections, 
bacteremia, pneumonia and intra-abdominal infections. 
However, since the mid-1980s, K. pneumoniae has also 
been described as the cause of highly invasive community-
acquired infections (1,2). The K. pneumoniae isolates as-
sociated with such infections are often hypermucoviscous 
and frequently belong to the capsular serotypes K1 or K2. 
Two of the most extensively studied genes associated with 
invasive infections are a mucoviscosity-associated gene 
A (magA) in serotype K1 and a regulator of mucoid phe-
notype A (rmpA). These strains of hypervirulent K. pneu-
moniae (hvKP) are now circulating worldwide (1,2).
At the same time, a substantial increase of high-level 
antimicrobial resistance acquired by non-hvKP strains has 
also been observed. Clonal complexes of hvKP and multi-
drug-resistant (MDR) strains had been considered indepen-
dent (3) until 2014, when extended-spectrum β-lactamase 
(ESBL)– or carbapenemase-producing hvKP were first 
identified in China (4). Here we report an ESBL-producing 
strain of hvKP isolated from a patient in France.
The patient was a 56-year-old woman, born in Algeria, 
who alternately resided in France and Algeria for several 
years without travel to any other country. She underwent liv-
er transplant in 2007 for primary biliary cirrhosis. In 2012, 
she had a routine posttransplant liver biopsy indicating 
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